

### A THIRD INDIVIDUATION: IMMIGRATION, IDENTITY, AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS

Immigration from one country to another is a complex psychosocial process with lasting effects on an individual's identity. The dynamic shifts, resulting from an admixture of "culture shock" and mourning over the losses inherent in migration, gradually give way to psychostructural change and the emergence of a hybrid identity. This paper delineates the factors affecting the psychological outcome of immigration and describes four interlinked strands in the fabric of identity change in immigrants. These involve the dimensions of drive and affects, interpersonal and psychic space, temporality, and social affiliation. Issues of idealization and devaluation, closeness and distance, hope and nostalgia, the transitional area of the mind, superego modification, mutuality, and linguistic transformation are highlighted. Implications of these ideas for the psychoanalytic process and technique in instances where the analyst, the analysand, or both are immigrants are briefly touched upon, as are caveats and limitations with regard to the proposed conceptualizations.

Thirty-two thousand years ago, hunters from north central Asia migrated across land bridging the tip of Siberia and the tip of Alaska. Of their path, long since submerged, only the Bering Strait is left. By the era of European exploration, in the late fifteenth century, descendants of these Asian nomads had migrated down through the Americas, forming distinctive tribes and evolving a cultural and linguistic heterogeneity comparable to that of the Europeans who mislabelled native tribesmen and their families "Indians" [Kraut, 1990, pp. 17-18].

Professor of Psychiatry, Jefferson Medical College; Training and Supervising Analyst, Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute.

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Immigration from one country to another is a complex and multifaceted psychosocial process with significant and lasting effects on an individual's identity. Leaving one's country involves profound losses. Often one has to give up familiar food, native music, unquestioned social customs, and even one's language. The new country offers strange-tasting food, new songs, different political concerns, unfamiliar language, pale festivals, unknown heroes, psychically unearned history, and a visually unfamiliar landscape. However, alongside the various losses is a renewed opportunity for psychic growth and alteration. New channels of self-expression become available. There are new identification models, different superego dictates, and different ideals. One thing is clear: immigration results in a sudden change from an "average expectable environment" (Hartmann, 1950) to a strange and unpredictable one.

The anxiety consequent upon this "culture shock" (Ticho, 1971; Handlin, 1973; Garza-Guerrero, 1974) challenges the stability of the newcomer's psychic organization. Another threat to it is posed by the mourning over the losses inherent in immigration. This coexistence of culture shock and mourning causes a serious shake-up of the individual's identity. A state of psychic flux, reminiscent of the "second individuation process of adolescence" (Blos, 1967), ensues. Reaching ontogenetically backward, one can also discern psychodynamic echoes of the childhood separation-individuation phase (Mahler et al., 1975)—the first stepping-stone for identity formation—in the immigrant's turmoil. The similarities between the two earlier individuations and the immigrant's identity transformation explain the phrase "a third individuation" in the title of this paper.<sup>1</sup> However, it must be emphasized that phenomenological resemblance does not mean genetic equation. In describing individuals migrating at significantly later stages of development, I am referring to characterological processes that are certainly more subtle and complex than those of early childhood or even adolescence. Much psychic structuralization has already ensued in these individuals; drives have

<sup>1</sup>That the phrase had been used earlier by Colarusso (1990) in describing the effects of biological parenthood on the separation-individuation process in adulthood was brought to my attention by Dr. Dorothy Holmes after I had decided the title of my paper. Having thought of it on my own, and for use in a considerably different context, I decided to retain the phrase in the title of my paper. However, I remain grateful to Dr. Holmes for informing me of this earlier use of the phrase.

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attained fusion and genital primacy, the ego is better organized, and a postadolescent superego is in place. Their moral, aesthetic, social, temporal, and linguistic transformation as a result of immigration is more a matter of adult adaptation than of a replicated childhood scenario, though the two cannot entirely be separated. The term *third individuation* should therefore be seen as denoting an adult life reorganization of identity, a potential reworking of earlier consolidations in this regard, and a semiplayful extension of a useful psychoanalytic metaphor.

With this as a backdrop, let me outline the scope of my contribution. In this paper, I will describe the psychic processes involved in the identity change consequent upon immigration. Although I will refer to the contributions of others, my views on the impact of immigration on identity will be based largely on the work of Mahler (Mahler, 1958a, 1958b; Mahler and Furer, 1968; Mahler et al., 1975; Mahler and McDevitt, 1980). Its combined interactive and intrapsychic emphasis lends itself especially well, both as a conceptual tool and a metaphorical counterpart, to elucidating the vicissitudes of identity in immigrants. I will begin by delineating the factors that affect the psychological outcome of immigration. Then I will describe four interconnected strands in the fabric of identity change in immigrants. Finally, I will comment on the implications of these ideas for the psychoanalytic process and technique.

## FACTORS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF IMMIGRATION

Clearly, the immigrant must give up part of his individuality, at least temporarily, in order to become integrated in the new environment. The greater the difference between the new community and the one to which he once belonged, the more he will have to give up [Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, p. 90].

Since moving from one location to another involves loss—loss of country, loss of friends, and loss of previous identity—all dislocation experiences may be examined in terms of the immigrant's or the refugee's ability to mourn and/or resist the mourning process. The extent to which the individual is able

intrapsychically to accept his or her loss will determine the degree to which an adjustment is made to the new life [Volkan, 1993, p. 65].

The psychological outcome of immigration is determined by a multitude of factors (Park, 1928; Brody, 1973; Favazza, 1980; Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989; Waters, 1990; Hertz, 1993; Risner et al., 1993; Volkan, 1993). *First*—and foremost—is whether the immigration is temporary or permanent. The situation of a diplomat assigned for a predetermined length of time to a foreign country differs from the migrant who has left home in the hope of settling down in a new land. *Second*, the degree of choice in leaving one's country also affects the subsequent adaptation. In this context, the following observation of Grinberg and Grinberg (1989) is highly significant: "Parents may be voluntary or involuntary emigrants, but children are always 'exiled': they are not the ones who decide to leave and they cannot decide to return at will" (p. 125). Also pertinent here is the time available for preparing oneself to leave a place. A sudden departure precludes anticipatory mourning and might complicate subsequent adaptation. *Third*, the possibility of revisiting the home country has its own effects on the outcome of the migratory process. Those who can easily and frequently visit their countries of origin suffer less than those who are barred from such "emotional refueling"; herein lies the main difference between the immigrant and the exile. *Fourth*, the effects of immigration on identity might differ in intensity with the age at which immigration occurs.<sup>3</sup> Children, for instance, being more open to learning and having emigrated in the company of the people in their immediate environment, might be less traumatized. At the same time, their dependence on caretaking adults who themselves are psychologically stressed might render

<sup>3</sup>Freud's three immigrations occurred during early childhood (at age three from Freiberg to Leipzig, and at age four from Leipzig to Vienna) and old age (at age eighty-two from Vienna to London). They did not therefore significantly affect his identity, which remained ethnically Jewish and culturally Viennese. At the same time, they were not devoid of psychic impact. Freud "never forgot the forests around Freiberg" and his "vocal, often reiterated detestation of Vienna" (Gay, 1988, pp. 9, 10) reflected not only the hardship, solitude, and anti-Semitism he faced there but also the fact that Vienna was not Freiberg. At the same time, when toward the end of his life he had to leave Vienna for London, Freud expressed much grief: "The feeling of triumph at liberation is mingled too strongly with mourning, for one had still very much loved the prison from which one has been released" (letter to Max Eitingon; Freud, June 6, 1938, quoted in Gay, 1988, p. 9).

them more vulnerable. A role is also played by phase-specific unconscious fantasies at the time of immigration. In infants and toddlers, the impact is largely through the mother's psychic reality. However, in oedipal-age children more specific fantasies, related to the fact that the decision to immigrate is a parental prerogative, might be mobilized. Similar differential effects on adolescents, young adults, the middle-aged, and the elderly are not difficult to imagine. *Fifth*, the reasons for leaving one's country also play a role in determining success or failure in adapting to the new environment. As regards external reality, was one "escaping from" financial hardship, political persecution, or ethnic strife, or was one "heading toward" new opportunities, wider horizons? Psychologically, was immigration an anxious or angry repudiation of primary objects or a manifestation of the ego's healthy alloplastic capacity? To be sure, such dichotomies are artificial, but the outcome of immigration might indeed vary with the economic balance of reality vs. intrapsychic and adaptive vs. neurotic components. *Sixth*, the extent to which an individual has achieved the intrapsychic capacity for separateness prior to immigration will also influence the effects of the actual separations involved in immigration. *Seventh*, the emotions with which the host culture receives the migrant also play a role in the latter's assimilation and associated identity change. A particular era in the history of a nation might be more receptive than another era to receiving immigrants. In an ironic twist to Freud's "anatomy is destiny" remark (1924, p. 178), skin color and the thickness of epicanthic folds acquire significance in this context. In other words, race might also play a role here. The forced immigration of Black slaves,<sup>3</sup> the desperate refuge-seeking of East European Jews, the influx of ambitious (if a

<sup>3</sup>The situation of Black slaves brought to this country was devastating not only because their immigration was forced and they lacked "emotional refueling," but also because they were psychophysically manhandled by the "host" population. They were used as targets of projection and, in an act of collective "soul murder" (Shen-gold, 1989), brainwashed to believe in their inherent racial inferiority. Effects of the intergenerational transmission of this trauma (Apprey, 1993) are still evident. However, the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the subsequent "Black is beautiful" and similar esteem-building social voices, the search for heritage and legacy (memorialized in Alex Haley's 1976 *Roots*), and the emergence (as well as belated recognition) of national and international heroes from within the group—are all signs of a reversal of the situation. Remembering Abraham's (1911) paper on the "determining power of names," the transition, in this context, from "Negro" to "Black" to "African-American" seems rich with psychosocial connotations.

bit colonially gaslighted) Indians and Pakistanis—the "midnight's children" of Salman Rushdie (1980)—and the recent spate of refugees from Cuba, Haiti, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam might indeed have elicited varying emotional responses from the American culture at large. *Eighth*, the magnitude of cultural differences between the adopted and the home country is an important variable. A move into the United States from Canada or England is clearly not the same as one from Korea or Yemen.<sup>1</sup> Settlage's observation (1992) that marked actual difference in parental personalities puts self- and object constancy to the test is pertinent here. It echoes Freud's earlier warning (1923) that if the ego's identifications "become too numerous, unduly powerful and incompatible with each other, a pathological outcome will not be far off" (p. 30). However, linguistic and skin-color similarities do not preclude the mourning of immigration. Such "invisible immigrants" (Stephen Shanfield, personal communication) also experience the losses and anxieties of immigration. *Finally*, the extent to which one's original role (especially one's vocation) can be resumed upon immigration also effects the assimilation process; maintaining one's professional identity assures an "inner continuity in change" (Lichtenstein, 1963). This hints at the fact that there are vocations and skills that are less transportable than others across cultures. To wit, this might involve psychoanalysis itself,<sup>2</sup> though one is readily tempted to think of more esoteric examples.

This long list of variables might give the impression that no two immigrations are the same and that even the use of the singular

<sup>1</sup>In the emphasis on the immigration from one country to another, it should not be overlooked that similar issues can be faced by individuals moving to culturally diverse regions within the same country. A poignant example of such "interior migrations" (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, p. 17) is the character played by Jon Voight in the popular 1969 movie *Midnight Cowboy*. See also the sociological observations of Coles (1967) on south-to-north migration in this country and of Brody (1973) on interior migrations within Brazil. The New Zealand poet James Baxter (1958) has rendered his experience of moving from one to another region of his country in a beautiful poem entitled "The Return."


<sup>2</sup>Babcock and Caudill (1958) report the situation of a Western analyst who, working for many years in Japan, had given up psychoanalysis. He found that whenever he attempted to analyze the hostile dependency on parental figures in Japanese patients, they reacted with severe depression. Noting that such depression necessitated many supportive measures, the analyst gradually began resuscitating his work to psychotherapy.

form *immigration* is questionable. While this might be the case, a core migratory process, resembling separation-individuation, does seem to unfold in most adult immigrants.<sup>3</sup> In tandem with the developmental tasks of the rapprochement subphase and the beginning of self- and object constancy (Mahler et al., 1975), this process can be seen as comprising of four interlinked journeys involving the dimensions of drives and affects, space, time, and social affiliation. Alternatively, these can be seen as involving psychic travel (1) from love or hate to ambivalence, (2) from near or far to optimal distance, (3) from "yesterday" or "tomorrow" to "today," and (4) from mine or yours to ours.

### FROM LOVE OR HATE TO AMBIVALENCE

Idealized, "all good" object images have to be integrated with "all bad" object images, and the same holds true for good and bad self images. In this process of synthesis, partial images of the self and of the objects are integrated into total object and self representations, and thus self and object representations become . . . more realistic [Kernberg, 1975, p. 27].

<sup>3</sup>I have arrived at these ideas from six convergent routes: (1) my own experience of two immigrations (the first an "interior migration" of considerable significance within India, the second from India to the United States, where I have lived for the past twenty-one years, been analyzed, and practiced analysis and psychotherapy, with both "native" and immigrant patients); (2) ethnographic observations made in intermingling with a large number of fellow immigrants from India; (3) regular, almost yearly reunions, spanning over two decades, with immigrant physicians who entered the U.S. at about the time I did and with whom in 1973-74 I completed my first year of residency in psychiatry—Drs. Getulio Tovar (Brazil), Aarno Vuotila (Finland), Harish Malhotra, Maya Malhotra, Kanan Patrawala, and Lila Rao (India), Danilo Campos (Philippines), and Young Ho Kim (South Korea); (4) a study of psychoanalytic and psychiatric writings on migration; (5) perusal of certain literary contributions dealing with the topic; and (6) formal and informal conversations with a number of immigrant colleagues within the profession about their experiences with migration—Drs. Nora Kramer (Argentina), James Hamilton and Stephen Shanfield (Canada), Mladan Šević (Croatia), Vamik Volkan (Cyprus), Wilfred Abse (England), Maurice Apprey (Ghana), Subhash Bhatia, Shashi Bhatia, and Dilip Ramchandani (India), Roknedin Safavi and Hossein Eiezdzy (Iran), Shimon Waldfoegel (Israel), Rita Rogers (Romania), and Dragan Svrakic (Yugoslavia). My conversations with Dr. Purnima Mehta, who emigrated from Idi Amin's Uganda to (successively) India, England, and the U.S., and my correspondence with Drs. Liika Croydon and Julian Stern (who have immigrated from Poland to Canada and from South Africa to England, respectively) has also furthered my knowledge of immigration-related experiences.



It is possible that we move beyond splitting by flickering back and forth fast enough to begin to see new pictures, much as the illusion of motion in motion pictures depends upon a succession of still pictures rapid enough to enlist persistence of vision to produce the subjective experience of continuity [Lewin and Schulz, 1992, p. 51].

Like the rapprochement subphase toddler (Mahler et al., 1975) and the transiently regressed adolescent (Blos, 1967; Kramer, 1980), the immigrant is vulnerable to splitting of the self and object representations (Kernberg, 1967) along libidinal and aggressive lines. The drastic change in external environment taxes the ego's adaptive capacities, and changed societal dictates on acceptable behavior cause drive dysregulation. A male immigrant from a sexually repressive culture, such as Saudi Arabia or Iraq, might find the casual friendliness of Western women uncomfortably stimulating. A female of similar background might unconsciously equate the Western woman with the oedipal rival and be stirred in her aggressive and competitive surivings; alternatively, the day-to-day intermingling with men might stimulate her repressed erotic longings. By contrast, a Western immigrant to a culture such as Japan, which prizes group affiliation over individuation, might suddenly be faced with repudiated symbiotic longings and wishes for masochistic submission to a dissociated harsh superego. Regardless of the specific form it takes, the cultural change consequent upon immigration is bound to test ego resilience, both from outside and from the forces unleashed within.

A frequent consequence, once the initial "disorienting anxieties" (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, p. 2) are overcome, and before more adaptive ego defenses can be put into place, is regression. Splitting becomes predominant and colors the immigrant's feelings about his two lands and his two self-representations. The country of origin is idealized, the new culture devalued. For an East-to-West immigrant, this often gives rise to the idea that Western culture is characterized by greed, sexual promiscuity, violence, and disregard

<sup>7</sup>A practicing subphase-like hypomania, with both defensive and adaptive functions, is also characteristic of this early period of entry into a new culture. However, unlike the early anxieties, this hypomania is never fully renounced. It resurfaces again and again throughout the life cycle whenever the need for mastering new cultural tasks arises (Anni Bergman, personal communication).

of generational boundaries; the Eastern, by contentment, instinctual restraint, love, humility, and respect for both young and old. For a West-to-East immigrant, a similar splitting of object representations yields a view of the East as riddled with indolence, filth, superstition, subservience, and a pathetic withering of instincts; the West as industrious, conscientious, orderly, instinctually gratifying, and encouraging of self-actualization.

Three points need to be added. First, these split views are subject to convincing shifts. One day the country of origin is idealized and the country of adoption devalued. The next day, it is the reverse. Second, such contradictory attitudes, while phenomenologically akin to the splitting seen during the rapprochement subphase, contain the projective repudiation of developmentally higher level conflicts as well. Falk (1974), for instance, has noted that countries or territories on the two sides of a border often unconsciously symbolize early parental figures. One country (usually that of origin) might come to represent the mother, and the other country the father, thus setting up a fertile ground for oedipal fantasy and enactment on the immigrant's part. Third, splitting, in no wise restricted to the object world, also afflicts the immigrant's self-representation. Being Belgian, Brazilian, Chinese, German, Indian, Iranian, Korean, or Filipino tends to be libidized and to become a source of pride. The newly emergent self-representation, say American, is devalued and seems shameful. Indeed, such one-sided instinctual investment often reverses itself; what was once idealized becomes devalued and vice versa. Here also, the phenomenological similarity with childhood libidinal-aggressive splitting should not lead one to overlook other issues (e.g., bisexual or oedipal) that might be involved. For instance, one self-representation might become imbued with male and the other female attributes,<sup>8</sup> one with the oedipally accepting and the other with oedipally defiant qualities in the unconscious. Guilt at success in the new country, "separation guilt" (Modell, 1965) vis-à-vis the old country, and "survivor's guilt" (Niederland, 1968) might also play a role here.

<sup>8</sup>Silber (1993) has recently argued that around the end of Civil War the North constructed a feminized interpretation of the South that validated the former's superiority. In emphasizing Southern helplessness, the Northerners even couched descriptions of Southern landscapes in feminine terms.

Gradually, a synthesis of two self-representations sets in. For this to take place, however, ample sustenance of "growth needs" (Casement, 1991, p. 274), enough "efficacy experiences" (Wolff, 1994, p. 73), and a positive balance of libido over aggression are necessary. Settlage's succinct remark (1992), made in connection with the initial achievement of self-constancy, is no less pertinent here: "The predominance of love is the glue of a unified self-representation" (p. 352). As a result of this synthesis, a capacity for good-humored ambivalence toward both the country of origin and that of adoption develops. A hyphenated identity now emerges. Such an identity, though perhaps lacking a deep anchoring in either historical-identification system, might yet possess a greater than usual breadth of experience, a sense of relativity, knowledge, and, at times, wisdom. An external manifestation of this psychostructural achievement is the immigrant's increasing comfort in simultaneously associating with individuals from both of his two cultures. A "mixed" guest list for a dinner at the immigrant's house is a telltale sign of such advance in identity consolidation.

### FROM NEAR OR FAR TO OPTIMAL DISTANCE

... going away leads to different consequences for a man's human and non-human experience. He can reproduce the old life with people in the new place, because people do not differ greatly from one to the other. He eventually finds new friends. But places can differ so profoundly that it is no longer possible to have certain sorts of experiences of place at all. Such deprivations and losses inevitably increase awareness of the non-human world, both the old and the new [Denford, 1981, p. 325].

It was not simply owing to the stressful circumstances attending the emigration that I became newly creative. It was rather that, with the stress came new vistas, new curiosity, new opportunities, and vital new sources of collegiate support. It was only in America, and only owing to the tremendous professional encouragement I received in America, that I no longer felt I was laboring under the shadow of titans [Mahler in Stepanisky, 1988, p. 121].

Elsewhere (Akhtar, 1992a) I have reviewed in detail the conceptual ambiguities, developmental origins, cultural vicissitudes, and

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technical implications of optimal distance. Here I will mention only that it is a hybrid concept (Bouvet, 1958; Balint, 1959; Escoll, 1992) that can be viewed from either the interpersonal or the intrapsychic perspective. Mahler herself describes it both as a position "between mother and child that best allows the infant to develop those faculties which he needs in order to grow, that is, to individuate" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 291) and as a later ego capacity for establishing an optimal distance from the internal representation of the mother (and, subsequently, of others). Mahler notes that during the symbi-otic phase there is no outside world for the infant and hence no distance. Gradually there develops "the space between mother and child" (Bergman, 1980, p. 201). Created by both the mother's comings and goings and a decrease in the baby's bodily dependence on her, this space<sup>9</sup> permits the child to look "beyond the symbiotic orbit" (Mahler, 1966, p. 155). The infant attempts to break away from passive lap-babyhood. During the practicing subphase, the child shows even greater ability to move away from the mother, at first by crawling and later by upright locomotion. The child makes pleasurable forays into the external world and seems oblivious to the mother's presence. Yet, revealing his continued need for a "home base," he periodically returns to the mother. In the rapprochement subphase, no distance from the mother appears satisfactory, but if the mother remains emotionally available despite the child's oscillations, the capacity for optimal distance gradually develops.

Reverberations of these themes can be found in the immigrant's interpersonal and intrapsychic life. At the external level, the immigrant has to rediscover the acceptable limits of interpersonal space (for a sociological perspective on interpersonal distance, see Hall, 1973; Zerubavel, 1991). The extent of physical contact, spatial proximity and psychological intimacy becomes a matter of renewed psychosocial negotiation and practice. More important, the immigrant finds himself "too far" from his country of origin, a distance that he, like the practicing phase toddler, might greatly enjoy for some time. Sooner or later, however, the anxiety of having exceeded the symbiotic orbit surfaces. The immigrant's ego loses the support it

<sup>9</sup>Winnicott (1971) is also interested in this space. However, his focus is not on the child's ambivalent efforts to minimize it but on its persistence and varying psychic uses throughout life.

had drawn from the familiar environment, climate, and landscape—all unconsciously perceived as extensions of the mother (Krystal and Peaty, 1963). "Attempts at restoration of such ego support may lead the immigrant to seek a climate and ethnic surrounding much like his original, and may become involved in a lifelong attempt at symbolic restitution of his motherland" (Krystal, 1966, p. 217).<sup>10</sup> A fantasy of return to the home country also emerges. The wish, like the rapprochement subphase child's regressive search for symbiosis, is, however, not free of ambivalence. In myriad rationalized ways, acting on it is postponed. Conditions (e.g., saving money, earning a diploma) are set for one's return but their fulfillment eludes the immigrant like a mirage. A frequent stopgap measure is actual travel back to the country of origin. Carrying back gifts to relatives left behind, and bringing cultural artifacts and mementos back to his new home, the immigrant reminds one of a toddler crisscrossing the space between himself and his mother. Bergman's comment (1980), though made in the latter connection, seems equally applicable to the immigrant.

As . . . he is able to move away farther, his world begins to widen, there is more to see, more to hear, more to touch, and each time he returns to mother he brings with him some of the new experience. In other words, each time he returns he is ever so slightly changed. The mother is the center of his universe to whom he returns as the circles of his exploration widen [p. 203].

The distance between two lands (two mothers, the "mother of symbiosis" and the "mother of separation") is also bridged by homoethnic ties in the new country, international phone calls, and listening to one's native music. These serve as "transitional objects" (Winnicott, 1953) and help bring what has become externally "too far" a bit nearer.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup>According to Krystal (1966), the artist Giorgio de Chirico's preoccupation with Italian landscapes is a conspicuous example of such a need.

<sup>11</sup>The situation is more complex for exiles (i.e., involuntary migrants who cannot return to their homelands). This blocks access to refueling. The child within is orphaned and must reclaim inch by inch the psychic territory lost. This is achieved with the aid of new transferences, introspection, and creativity, as well as old photographs, music, books, relics, etc.; under such circumstances physical possessions acquire the status of "linking objects" (Volkan, 1981). Such a mourning process may last a lifetime and still remain incomplete (see Pollock, 1989). The availability of a

On an internal level too, the immigrant fluctuates between extremes of distance from his native self-representation and his newly emerging self-representation as a resident of the adopted country. Failure to negotiate the distance between these self-representations results in two problematic outcomes of identity (Teja and Akhtar, 1981): ethnocentric withdrawal and counterphobic assimilation. The first involves clinging to an idealized view of one's earlier culture. Individuals so withdrawn eat only the food of their native land and associate only with homoethnic groups. Their residences, replete with artifacts from "back home," take on a shrine-like quality. Such persons become more nationalistic vis-à-vis their country of origin than they were while still living there. To buttress such secondary nationalism, they often forge unlikely alliances and develop new prejudices. In contrast to this ethnocentric withdrawal, counterphobic assimilation is a caricature of the practicing subphase toddler. Intoxicated by the widening horizon of their experiential world, these individuals totally renounce their original culture. In an "as if" fashion (Deutsch, 1942) and through "magic identification" (Jacobson, 1964), they rapidly incorporate the host culture. Clearly, both ethnocentric withdrawal and counterphobic assimilation are multiply determined (Waelder, 1980), though difficulty with aggression perhaps plays a large role here. More common are solutions that appear to be compromise formations but nonetheless emanate from a splitting of the self and the object world. These include (1) pragmatic assimilation masking nonassimilation, the relationship between the two structures being akin to the "false" and "true" selves of Winnicott (1960), and (2) temporally alternating phases of closeness and distance from one or the other culture. An individual caught up in the latter solution ends up having "native phases" and "assimilated phases" in a "life lived in pieces" (Pfeiffer, 1974).

A deeper mending of being "too close" or "too far" from one or the other culture begins if the "holding environment" (Winnicott, 1960), within both the family<sup>12</sup> and the culture at large, provides

proxy base for "emotional refueling" (e.g., the state of Israel for East European Jewish migrants to, say, the United States) might prevent such frozen grief.

<sup>12</sup>In a study of 385 Soviet immigrant physicians to Israel, Rüster et al. (1993) found the prevalence of depression to be strongly correlated with disturbed intrafamilial relations.

ample fibidinal sustenance and containment of aggression. Manifestations of such mending include (1) increased comfort with one's ethnic/national origins in the workplace, along with greater use of one's new self-representation at home. This results in an enhanced "continuity of personal character" (Erikson, 1956, p. 102), a hallmark of solid identity; (2) establishment of a predictable and reality-governed rhythm of refueling through international phone calls and visits; and (3), in the case of those who become parents in the adopted country, deeper acceptance of their offspring's mixed but predominantly local loyalties.

### FROM YESTERDAY OR TOMORROW TO TODAY

The failure of mourning leads to a continuing search for the idealized lost object, an inability to love new objects, a depreciation of objects in one's current life, and an endless pursuit of nostalgic memories for themselves at the expense of an inhibition in many areas of existence [Werman, 1977, p. 396].

I would give all the landscapes of the world for that of my childhood. I must add, though, that if I make a paradise out of it, only the tricks or infirmity of memory can be held responsible [Cioran, 1982, p. 12; quoted in Amati-Mehler et al., 1993, p. 266].

The separation-individuation phase contains elements of mourning. With each progressive move toward autonomy and identity consolidation, there is an incremental loss of infantile omnipotence, symbiotic bliss, and ego simplification through splitting and projection. Compensation for this is found in the secondary narcissism of burgeoning ego capacities, autonomous functioning, a realistic self-concept, and deeper object relations. A similar sequence of loss and restoration is evident in the psychic journeys described so far. I will now focus on its impact on the immigrant's rootedness in the time experience.

Facing the "mental pain" (Freud, 1926, p. 169) of separation, the immigrant often resorts to a hypercathexis of the lost objects. Described originally by Freud (1917) in "Mourning and Melancholia," this mechanism results in an idealization of the immigrant's past. Often such idealization centers more upon memories of places

than of people. This is not surprising. Throughout childhood and adolescence, the nonhuman environment presents itself as a relatively neutral alternative area in which all the vicissitudes of human interactions can be expressed, experienced, and worked through in relative psychic privacy (Searles, 1960). The inherent repudiation of aggression and the screen functions of nostalgia for lost places (Sterba, 1940; Freedman, 1956; Werman, 1977) notwithstanding, the immigrant employing this mechanism comes to live in the past. His most powerful affects are reserved for his recall of the houses, street-corners, cafés, hills, and countryside of his homeland. Like an emotionally deprived child with but one toy, he clings to their memories. Ever wistful, the immigrant convinces himself that "if only" (Akhtar, 1991, 1994) he had not left these places, his life would have been wonderful or, more frequently, that when he was there he had no problems. The sharp retort of the great Urdu poet Ghalib (1797-1869) finds no resonance in him:

"Karte kis munh sey ho ghurbat ki shikayat Ghalib?  
Tum ko bemehriye—yaaran—e—watan yaad nahin?"

[O Ghalib, with what audacity do you complain of being in a strange land?

Have you forgotten the callousness of friends at home?]

(Ghalib, 1841, p. 84)

The fantasy of a lost paradise expresses a position whereby primary objects are neither given up through the work of grieving nor assimilated into the ego through identification. The result is a temporal fracture of the psyche. This can at times manifest itself in the immigrant's fervent plans to "someday" (Akhtar, 1991, 1994) return to his homeland; fantasies of retirement or burial in one's country of origin are versions of this wish temporarily displaced even further. With such a dynamic shift, the future comes to be idealized, robbing the present of full commitment. Often these "if only" and "someday" fantasies coexist, with nostalgia providing the fuel for the hope of return.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>In discussing Freud's love of England, Ivan Ward (1993), educational director of the Freud Museum in London, touches on many factors, one of which echoes the "if only"—"someday" connection mentioned here: "It appears, then, that Freud was an encapsulated ideal in the past, and that England was an ideal 'other place' in the future. . . . Freud's journey to England, therefore, may also have been a return to something: a return to some idyllic fantasy of childhood" (p. 38).

The temporal direction of the "if only" and "someday" fantasies differs, but their message is essentially the same. Also, while their conscious focus is on immigration, both fantasies clearly contain ontogenetically earlier issues. At bottom, the "if only" fantasy says, "I wish the day had not come when I lost the blissful symbiotic dual unity with my mother, or the day when I became aware of sexual differences and oedipal boundaries." The "someday" fantasy says, "A day will come when I will recapture the lost mother of symbiosis and overcome the sexual and oedipal barriers." The former attitude fixates the immigrant in the past, the latter in the future. Both cause a temporal discontinuity in the self-experience (Akhtar, 1984, 1992b). The revered Chilean poet Gabriela Mistral (1889-1957) has captured the essence of such psychic fracturing in the following lines of her poem "The Immigrant Jew":<sup>14</sup>

I am two. One looks back,  
the other turns to the sea.  
The nape of my neck seethes with good-byes  
and my breast with yearning.

With progressive deidealization of lost objects, however, meaningful living in the present becomes possible. This does not imply a total renunciation of past objects, only of their hypercathexis. Indeed, continued updating and an ongoing psychic dialogue with the past (Erikson, 1950a; Lichtenstein, 1963) are not only inevitable but necessary for healthy psychic functioning. However, in such instance, past and future do not replace today. They enrich it.

### FROM YOURS OR MINE TO OURS

The Japanese person would feel uncomfortable in thinking of his "self" as something separable from his role. To actualize oneself is to fulfill one's family and social group role expectations. In a traditionally oriented Japanese mind, to be "individualistic" in a Western moral sense would almost be equal to being "selfish" in the worst sense of the term. Japanese tend

<sup>14</sup> I am indebted to Dr. Peter Olsson for bringing this poem to my attention.

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to equate "individualism" (kojinshugi) with "selfishness" (koku-shugi) (Yamamoto and Wagaizuma, 1980, p. 123).

Shortly after my landing in the United States I received a rejection to an application for an internship from a southern hospital worded as follows: "we have found that persons not of our denomination do not feel comfortable working here." A similar letter was sent to my wife and me from an Adirondack mountain resort. Still later, when we purchased a vacation home in Connecticut, we were quickly informed that the nearby country club (to which we had no intentions of applying) would not admit Jews (Wangh, 1992, p. 16).

In an extension of Mahler's observations regarding the symbiotic dual unity gradually yielding to self- and object differentiation, Bergman (1980) suggests that the sense of "mine" and "yours" develops out of an earlier sense of "ours." She adds that the feeling of "we" is "psychically experienced as the 'me' of primary narcissism which still dominates the symbiosis. Only gradually does this archaic 'we' experience develop to include differentiated 'me' and 'we' experience" (p. 205). While I understand this formulation, my notions about the development of mutuality follow the opposite trajectory. Or perhaps I am simply referring to Bergman's "differentiated 'we'" experience. True mutuality, codified through "we" and "ours," while containing symbiotic roots, has additional developmental origins. Klein's views (1937) about the child's dawning sense of gratitude toward the mother are pertinent in this regard, as are Winnicott's notions (1963) about the development of the capacity for concern. The experience of sharing the parents (and even aspects of one's own personality) with siblings also contributes to the capacity for mutuality. More important, a successful resolution of the oedipal phase consolidates the capacity for mutuality ("my father is also your husband; my mother is also your wife; we share him/her"). This sketchy ontogenesis of mutuality demonstrates that a differentiated "we" follows "mine" and "yours" and lays the groundwork for elucidating the immigrant's struggles in this regard.

For a considerable time after his arrival in the new land, the immigrant resorts to a "mine" and "yours" split. It is only by resolving this split that he can experience "ours." Until then, customs, food, language, games, and moral values are seen as either "mine" or "yours." An important vehicle in the move toward "we-ness" and

the associated identity change is the filling-in of the "transitional area" (Winnicott, 1953) by local culture. The immigrant's starting to enjoy the movies, literature, and games of his new country heralds such a move. They provide him a ready-made zone of mutual interest with the "foreigners" of his new country. A second medium that facilitates cultural mutuality is the progressive alteration of the immigrant's superego in an encounter with externally changed prohibitions and sanctions. The situation is akin to adolescence (Erikson, 1950b; Blos, 1967), though clearly the drive upsurge is only relative and is mobilized by altered realities. An instinctually more permissive society, which presents a threat to ego stability, might at first cause anxiety in the immigrant. Then a liquid phase might set in during which experimentations with new id freedoms fluctuates with retribution from the "imported" superego. Gradually these dynamic shifts give way to structural alteration with the deployment of new ego defenses and a softening of the superego. The immigrant's notions about right and wrong shift and come into greater accordance with the culture at large.<sup>15</sup>

The most important vehicle for the emergence of "we-ness" is, however, the acquisition of (or, increased idiomatic fluency in) a new language. The journey from speaking only one's "mother tongue," through an introject-like use (Kernberg, 1976) of a new language, to true bilingualism, is as difficult as it is salutary.<sup>16</sup> Early in this journey, the native language can become an object of idealization and create the narcissistic illusion that only it can express things well (Stengel, 1939; Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989). Its "sonorous

<sup>15</sup>In an application of the Russian thinker Bakhtin's theory of "dialogism" to cross-cultural hermeneutics (1986, 1990), Harris (1993) notes that the encounter between the immigrant and his adopted culture is not one-sided. Though the impact on the immigrant is clearer, the culture itself is affected and inherently altered by the newcomer's interpretation of it.

<sup>16</sup>The paucity of psychoanalytic literature on polylingualism and polyglotism is striking, especially since (1) many early analysts were analyzed in languages other than their mother tongue; (2) most analysts read Freud's writings in translation; (3) many analysts have experience with being analyzed or conducting analysis in a language that is not their mother tongue or with analyzing patients whose mother tongue is one other than their own; and (4) most important, words form such an important medium of communication in the analytic enterprise. The early contributions of Ferenczi (1911) and Stengel (1939), the later work of Buxbaum (1949) and Greenson (1950, 1954), a more recent essay by Flegenheimer (1989), and a most outstanding monograph by Amati-Mehler et al. (1993) on this topic are exceptions in this regard.

wrapping" (Anzic, 1976) is tenaciously clung to; after all, the "mother tongue" is a link to the earliest maternal image. The new language, accordingly, is devalued as being weak and ridiculous. Consequently, the immigrant lives in two linguistic worlds, pronouncing his own name in two different ways, and switching with relief to his mother tongue once the workday is over. However, such aching polyglotism<sup>17</sup> adds to the splitting of self-representations. Francois Cheng (1985), a Chinese emigré to France, who did not know a word of French until he was twenty, eloquently describes such a linguistic cleavage of the self.<sup>18</sup> The same pain is reflected by Julia Kristeva (1988):

Not to speak your own mother tongue. To live with sounds, logics, that are separated from the nocturnal memory of the body, from the sweet-sour sleep of childhood. To carry within yourself like a secret crypt or like a handicapped child—loved and useless—that language of once-upon-a-time that fades and won't make up its mind to leave you ever. You learn to use another instrument, like expressing yourself in algebra or on the violin. You can become a virtuoso in this new artifice that provides you with a new body, just as false, sublimated—some would say sublime. You have the impression that the new language is your resurrection: a new skin, a new sex. But the illusion is torn apart when you listen to yourself—on a recorded tape, for example—and the melody of your own voice comes back to you in a bizarre way, from nowhere, closer to the grumble of the past than to the [linguistic] code of today. . . . Thus, between two languages, your element is silence [p. 20; quoted in Amati-Mehler et al., 1993, pp. 264–265].

A more optimistic note is struck by the writer Eva Hoffman (1989), who describes her inner translations from her native Polish

<sup>17</sup>Amati-Mehler et al. (1993) distinguish polylingualism from polyglotism. The former refers to the acquisition of various languages, often simultaneously, throughout childhood. The latter refers to the learning of a new language later in life, based predominantly on translation, and with many fewer emotional connotations than accompany the early natural acquisition of a language.

<sup>18</sup>In a less dramatic vein, Freud also expressed a similar emotion. Soon after his arrival in England, he wrote to Raymond de Saussure, the Swiss psychoanalyst who had congratulated him on his escape: "Perhaps, you have omitted the one point that the emigrant feels so particularly painfully. It is—one can only say—the loss of the language in which one had lived and thought, and which one will never be able to replace with another for all one's efforts at empathy." (Freud, June 11, 1938; quoted in Gay, 1988, p. 632).

into English, which she had to learn when she immigrated to the anglophone world:

[In] my translation therapy, I keep back and forth over the rifts, not to heal them but to see that—one person, first person singular—have been on both sides. Patiently, I use English as a conduit to go back and down, all the way down to childhood, almost to the beginning. When I learn to say those smallest, first things in the language that has served for detachment and irony and abstraction, I begin to see where the languages I've spoken have their correspondences—how I can move between them without being split by the difference [p. 273].

Perhaps the degree to which a linguistically lacerated self can be healed is variable.<sup>26</sup> However, mending is in evidence with an increasing dominance of the acquired language, which begins to appear in spontaneous humor, dreams, and in talking in one's sleep. Another indicator of linguistic identity change is seen when the immigrant begins to treat the obscenities, terms for genitals, and curses of his new language with an instinctual and moral valence comparable to that invested in similar words of his mother tongue. For a long time, the immigrant's unblinking use of obscenities in his acquired language neither provides him a gratifying id discharge nor causes him a noticeable superego admonishment. ("When you say 'fuck' it doesn't sound dirty, but when I say 'fuck' it sounds dirty," said a perceptive medical student to me some twelve years ago!) For "real" cursing, the immigrant uses his native language only. Gradually, however, as the associative networks of both languages begin to interdigitate, the more recently acquired obscenities too gather affective valence, though perhaps never of truly equal degree to the obscene words in the mother tongue (see Ferenczi, 1911).

Two more points need to be considered. First, different self-representations might remain under the influence of different languages and express different (developmentally earlier and later?)

<sup>26</sup>Nabokov, Beckett, and Rushdie are three immigrant writers who show three completely different attitudes in this regard. Nabokov moved in succession from a mastery of Russian, French, and German to English, in which he wrote his best-known works. Beckett "migrated" to French and after many years returned to writing in his native English (for Beckett's relationship with his mother tongue, see Casement, 1982). Rushdie freely sprinkles his English text with Urdu/Hindi colloquialisms from India and thus creates a hybrid language of his own.

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conflicts and aspirations.<sup>26</sup> Second, adopting a new language might at times represent the acquisition of a developed identity for the first time. Amati-Mehler et al. (1993), who have authored the most searching psychoanalytic investigation of language so far, conclude that

a multilingual dimension certainly does allow for an internal enrichment not only at the cognitive level. However, it is also true that the actual mental organization of the multilingual subject lends itself in particular to the enacting of defenses, splittings, and repressions. Occasionally a new language represents a life-saving anchor which allows for "rebirth." At other times it can be a justification for the mutilation of the internal world of the self [p. 108].

### TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS

One must distinguish the acquisition of knowledge, which comes about as a result of modification of pain (then the knowledge obtained will be used for new discoveries), from possession of knowledge, which is used to avoid painful experiences [Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, pp. 65-66].

polylingual patients . . . will have at their disposal a defense that allows them to avoid areas in their psychic life that are problematic. By changing language, they will be able to avoid not only the subset, but the whole language of infantile sexuality, thus denying themselves and us access to an area so intimately linked to specific verbal sounds and special names [Amati-Mehler et al., 1993, p. 34].

Having myself been both an immigrant analyst and an immigrant analyst, I can attest that both facts do impact on the technical aspects of psychoanalysis. In this section, I will comment on some of the vicissitudes of the analytic process from both perspectives. I am not recommending specific strategies, only a background<sup>27</sup> for the

<sup>26</sup>Could this partly explain the fact that unlike great prose, great poetry, which draws heavily on the prosodic qualities of a language, has never been written in a later-acquired language?

<sup>27</sup>"A background," said the eminent British photographer Lord Snowdon, "has to be just this side of being something, and just the other side of being nothing." (*Time*, August 27, 1984).

"evenly suspended attention" (Freud, 1912, p. 111) mandatory for our work. My recommendations should therefore not be construed as rigid, or as necessary in all instances. At the same time I believe that in working with immigrant patients the following eight guidelines need to be kept in mind.

1. Certain matters regarding the analytic framework, especially the issue of punctuality for sessions, may be affected by cultural differences. The analyst must keep in mind that there might exist discrepancies in the experience of time<sup>24</sup> and in the conventions used to manage time between his and the patient's society of origin. What constitutes punctuality varies cross-culturally and even within subcultures (Pande, 1968; Lager and Zwerling, 1980; Antokoletz, 1993). Such awareness will enhance the analyst's empathic ability to distinguish between a culturally determined trivial lateness for sessions from a meaningful "attack on the analytic process" (Limentani, 1989, p. 252). Similar considerations might apply to the analyst's degree of deference and his ease or difficulty in negotiating a fee.

2. In a related vein, the analyst must help the patient disengage cultural from intrapsychic conflicts, however much the two might overlap. Analysts might seek to distance themselves from their own inner psychic lives, as well from the emerging wishes in the transference, by invoking cultural issues. Such use of "reality" as a defense must be vigilantly observed and interpretively handled, although the rapidity and depth of such uncovering must be guided by tact (Poland, 1975) and by regard for optimal distance (Bouvet, 1958; Akhtar, 1992a).

3. The analyst must watch for ways in which cultural differences affect transference and countertransference. In this context, the literature on biracial (black/white) analyses suggests that racial difference contributes not only to stereotyped transferences, resistance, and countertransference difficulty in maintaining an analytic stance (Fischer, 1971; Goldberg et al., 1974) but also to facilitating individual specific transference developments (Holmes, 1992).

<sup>24</sup>For the East, relatively speaking, past, present, and future merge into one another; for the West they are discrete entities. For the East, experience in time is like water collected in a pool (stagnant perhaps); for the West, time is more like water flowing in a stream, and one is acutely aware that what flows away, flows away forever" (Pande, 1968, pp. 428-429).

4. The analyst might at times validate the immigrant's feeling dislocated in the mainstream culture before handling the material interpretively or for reconstruction. In cases where the task and is the subject of significant prejudice, the use of such "mirroring" (Kohut, 1977) and affirming interventions can have healing effects of their own without compromising the analytic approach. Crucial here is the analyst's capacity to oscillate between a credulous and a skeptical listening attitude (Strenger, 1989) with the former yielding "affirmative interventions" (Killingme, 1989) and the latter, interpretive interventions.

5. The analyst must recognize that mourninglike elements, integral to all analyses, carry greater significance in the treatment of immigrants. He must empathize with the immigrant analyst's loss of historical continuity and the need for its restoration. Patients' lapses into nostalgia must find respect and empathic countertransference in the analyst, though clearly not at the cost of his overlooking the "screen" functions of such nostalgia (Sterba, 1940; Werman, 1977). Similarly, the analyst must permit the patient ample psychic space to dwell on his lost culture, while all the time keeping an eye on the covert resistance functions and transference messages in the material. A Peruvian woman in analysis, for instance, began talking about her beloved grandmother's funeral some years ago, soon after I had told her of my unavailability for a few days. The connection was obvious. I waited. Gradually, intricate details of Peruvian funeral rituals began to occupy her associations. Her sadness of a few minutes ago was replaced by a vigorous tone, as I found myself raptly absorbed in the material and felt enriched. Returning to a self-serving stance, I noted that she not only had defensively thwarted her pain but had also given me a parting gift. Interpretive intervention along this line deepened the material and facilitated the analytic work.

6. With patients who come from cultures in which a "familial self" (Yamamoto and Wagatsuma, 1980; Kakar, 1985; Roland, 1988) is the modal psychic structure, the analyst must be tolerant not only of seemingly inoptimal individuation (both in character and as a result of analytic work), but also of multiple transferences (with figures other than parental) and a profusion of close and distant relatives in the associative material. Taketomo's observations (1989)

regarding the Japanese analysand's "teacher transference" are significant in this context.

7. The analyst must squarely face the challenge posed by the patient's polyglotism to the task of analysis. On the one hand, the analyst must remain aware of the defensive and resistance aspects of the patient's use of a second language.<sup>23</sup> This certainly allows for an emotional separation from the words of the birth language which retains the whole load of emotional, sensory, and perceptual vicissitudes linked to corporal experiences within the primary relationship" (Amati-Mehler et al., 1993, p. 71). Following Ferenczi's terse reminder (1911) of the difference in the use of obscene words in one's original language, as opposed to their use in an acquired language, many analysts (Buxbaum, 1949; Greenson, 1950) require that the patient speak, or at least utter some significant words, in his mother tongue. Others differ, including Lagache (1956); Benani (1985), who conducts analyses in both Arabic and French; and Amati-Mehler et al. (1993). They recommend that the analyst be more interested in the defensive uses of the second language, the forces underlying the emergence of a wish to speak in one's mother tongue, the rigid and apprehensive avoidance of the mother tongue, the meaning of wanting an analyst who does or does not speak one's mother tongue, and, in essence, the dynamic "moment when the analytic relationship reconfirms the themes linked to the mother tongue" (Amati-Mehler et al., 1993, p. 80). Viewed in this fashion, technical choices regarding language must derive not from rigid formulas but from the specific ebb and flow of the analytic material and the emotional ambience both of the relationship and of the particular session.

8. The analyst must bear in mind his relatively greater role as a new object in the treatment of immigrant patients. The similarities between the developmental process and the analytic process (Loewald, 1960; Blum, 1971; Fleming, 1972; Greenacre, 1975; Robbins, in Escoll, 1977; Schlessinger and Robbins, 1988; Burland, 1986; Settlage, 1992, 1993) may be more marked in such analyses. At the

<sup>23</sup>Freud's lapsing into Latin, *matrem nudam*, while describing at age forty-one the childhood memory of having seen his mother naked is a striking example of such defensive use of a second language (letter to Fliess, October 3, 1897, in Masson, 1985, p. 268).

same time, this should propel the analysis neither into unneeded supportive measures nor into manipulative attempts at superego alteration, however adaptive the latter might seem from the analyst's own cultural vantage point.

Now let me add a few words about conducting analysis as an immigrant analyst.<sup>24</sup> Important here is the analyst's own "third individuation" and continuing self-analysis. His ability to maintain cultural neutrality and optimal distance between his own hybrid identity and his native patient's relatively monolithic one is of course crucial. The analyst should be unobtrusively curious about the analysand's choice of analyst. However, the resulting skepticism should be tempered by the recognition that at times such choices may not have "deep" significance. (Only a third of my analytic patients have revealed significant conscious or unconscious motivations involving my being an immigrant in their choice of me as an analyst.) Similarly, he should scan the associative material for disguised and displaced references to his ethnicity/race, but not without an interest in their deeper psychic meanings for the patient or at the cost of considering every such reference as transferentially significant. His occasional wishes to intervene in his mother tongue have usually to be met with ego restraint and, more important, with further grief work and self-analytic inquiry into the specific dyadic transaction triggering such a wish. Finally, his deep conviction of the universality of fundamental psychic configurations and the ubiquitousness of human conflicts will help him hear and understand (both within himself and in his patients) "voices that are not necessarily unified and not always unified" (Amati-Mehler et al., 1993, p. 283), while continuing his analytic work. A tricky situation might appear when an immigrant (especially one from the analyst's native country) presents for analysis. On the one hand, the potential for "shared ethnic scotoma" (Shapiro and Pinsker, 1973) is heightened under such circumstances. On the other, the situation brings an immigrant analyst one

<sup>24</sup>In light of the fact that a large number of early British and American analysts were immigrants (and there still are many), the lack of literature in this area is surprising. Perhaps this omission can best be explained by the reluctance of mainstream psychoanalysis to deal with sociological, historical, and cultural factors in adult life in favor of an exclusive focus on the intrapsychic residues of early childhood.

step closer to his native-born colleagues who are exposed daily to such clinical pitfalls.

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

A new identity will reflect the final consolidation into a remodeled ego identity of those selective identifications with the new culture which were harmoniously integrated or fitted in with the past cultural heritage. What actually ensues from the crisis of culture shock, if adequately solved, is a fecund growth of the self. What began as a threat to identity, mourning, and low self-esteem ends in a confirmation of both ego identity and self-esteem [Garza-Guerrero, 1974, p. 425].

Instead of positing unified, discrete cultures and nations to which we can all someday claim to belong, recent works suggest that we are bound to have fragmented allegiances, and dissonant voices within ourselves that name our world. This is not, I believe, some new version of the melting pot, for that assumes a synthesis which seems not only overly idealistic, but in fact undesirable. Instead of synthesis, there is the frightening but also exciting potential of multiplicity. Instead of completion or closure, there is the anxiety of partial identities as well as the challenge of ongoing process [Copelman, 1993, p. 79].

Throughout this paper my emphasis has been on the resolution of splitting of self and object world that tends to result from immigration. I have proposed that mending of such splits in four dimensions—drives and affects, space, time, and social affiliation—is what leads to a psychic rebirth, the emergence of a new and hybrid identity. Now I wish to offer some caveats in order to "soften" the proposed model and render it more realistic. (1) The four dynamic progressions described earlier are neither independent of each other nor exhaustive. There might be dimensions that I have failed to include or even recognize. (2) These developmental tracks do not have clear end points. The identity change of immigration continues to evolve throughout the life span. (3) The progression outlined here is characteristic only of uncomplicated cases where the capacity for intrapsychic separateness existed before immigration, where there was at least some choice in leaving one's country, and where the host country was more or less welcoming. However, in

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instances where the preimmigration character structure is problematic, where migration is forced and the possibility of revisiting the country does not exist, and where a good-enough holding environment is not found in the new land, the mourning necessary for such psychological advance might not be feasible. (4) Even the hybrid identity that emerges as a consequence of advance along these four lines is not a rocklike structure. Indeed, in certain psychosocial realms one or the other self-representation might continue to predominate. Searles' (1968) reminder that a healthy identity does not possess a monolithic solidity is pertinent here. Eisman's (1980) view of a well-functioning self as comprising of subsets of self-representations with variable proximity to affect, action, and fantasy also speaks to this point. (5) It is the intrapsychic meaning that various self- and object representations come to acquire—the resistance purposes (including defensive functions against drive derivatives) served by shifts in them, their adaptive aspects, and their vivid or concealed unfolding in the transference-countertransference axis—that is of technical significance of our work as analysts.

I will conclude with a poem and a final comment. The poem is entitled "A World without Seasons."

In the greedy flim-flam

For two worlds, we have lost the one in hand.

And now,

Like the fish who chose to live on a tree,

We writhe in foolish agony.

Our gods reduced to grotesque exhibits.

Our poets mute, pace in the empty halls of our conversation.

The silk of our mother tongue banned from the fabric

Of our dreams.

And now,

We hum the national anthem but our

Pockets do not jingle with the coins of patriotism.

Barred from weddings and funerals,

We wear good clothes to no avail.

Proudly we mispronounce our own names,

And those of our monuments and our children.

Forsaking the grey abodes and sunken graves of

Our ancestors, we have come to live in

A world without seasons.

I wrote this poem of loss, linguistic cleavage, wishfulness, temporal dislocation, and cultural unbelonging in 1982, nine years after my immigration to the United States. Now, twelve years further down the road, I have authored this paper. While even the most cursory look at the two would readily reveal the advance in my own mourning process, there do remain unanswered questions. What does including this poem in the paper indicate? Continued pain or its mastery or some combination of both? More important, why is it that I expressed my pain of loss in poetry and my pride over mastery of this loss in prose? Is poetry the "language of the id" (Karpf, 1935) and prose that of the ego? If so, is my move from poetry to prose, in this context, a reflection of what Freud (1933) declared the goal of psychoanalysis to be: "Where id was there ego shall be"?

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## Salman Akhtar

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1201 Chestnut Street, Suite #1503  
Philadelphia, PA 19107